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Appealability of Interlocutory Orders
Enjoining or Refusing To Enjoin
Commercial Arbitration
By TIMOTHY B. DYE*
INTRODUCTION
Among former Supreme Court Justice Stanley Reed's
many interests during his tenure in the federal executive and
judicial branches were issues of federal court jurisdiction. Bal-
timore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger,1 one of Justice Reed's
opinions in the area of federal jurisdiction, is closely related to
a continuing controversy concerning federal court jurisdiction
to hear appeals from orders granting or denying injunctions
barring arbitration. The courts of appeals are split on the
right of appeal in these arbitration cases, and the Supreme
Court has yet to resolve the issue. The issue of appealability is
of considerable importance in view of the increasing utiliza-
tion of arbitration proceedings as a method of dispute resolu-
tion and because of the likelihood that the issue will have an
impact on the willingness of parties to enter into contracts
providing for resolution of disputes through arbitration. This
article suggests that the reasons for allowing appeals to be
taken from these interlocutory orders are more persuasive
than are the countervailing arguments.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK-THE UNITED STATES
ARBITRATION ACT
In the federal courts, most questions concerning arbitra-
* A.B. 1958, LL.B. 1961, Harvard University. Member of the District of Colum-
bia and New York Bars. Mr. Dyk served as a law clerk to Justice Stanley Reed in the
1961 Term.
The author notes that he is not without personal experience in this area, being
counsel in a pending arbitration and having unsuccessfully sought to appeal an order
declining to enjoin arbitration in the case referred to in footnote 38. The opinions
expressed are those of the author only who wishes to express great appreciation for
the assistance rendered by Jonathan Becker in the preparation of this article.
Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955).
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tion arise under the United States Arbitration Act (USAA)2
This statute, enacted in 1925, provides for federal judicial en-
forcement and effectuation of written arbitration provisions
contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or admi-
ralty.' The purpose of the law is "to make valid and enforcible
[sic] agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involv-
ing interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or [sic] ad-
miralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the Fed-
eral courts."4
The need for a statutory enactment arose from the his-
toric refusal of the common law to provide specific enforce-
ment of agreements to arbitrate on the ground that such en-
forcement would oust the courts from their jurisdiction." The
USAA rejects this theory of judicial monopoly.6 Instead, the
Act provides methods for ensuring that all parties to an arbi-
tration agreement submit to arbitration,7 provides that arbi-
trators be selected if no procedure for their selection is estab-
lished by contract,8 grants arbitrators authority to compel the
attendance of witnesses,9 and grants the federal courts author-
ity to review, modify, set aside or enforce an arbitration
award.10
Additionally, under the USAA, the federal courts are
charged with resolving the threshold issue of arbitrability,
which is present regardless of the form of arbitration clause
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976). Occasional questions of arbitrability under state arbi-
tration acts may arise in a federal court. For example, where the court has diversity
jurisdiction and the contract involves purely intrastate commerce, the federal court
must decide the issue under state law. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,
350 U.S. 198 (1956).
3 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
" H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924). The latter part of this state-
ment concerning contracts "which may be the subject of litigation in Federal courts"
is not entirely accurate. See note 2 supra for a discussion of the role of the state
arbitration acts.
5 Id. at 1-2. See also Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint
Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judi-
ciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
6 Id.
9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (1976).
8 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
0 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1976).
10 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-13 (1976).
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chosen by the contracting parties. Because the Supreme Court
has expansively construed the so-called "standard" or "broad"
arbitration clauses," issues of arbitrability under such clauses
primarily involve the question of whether rights asserted
under other federal statutes, such as the antitrust or securities
laws, are arbitrable. 12 If the contracting parties do not adopt
the broad form of arbitration clause and instead contract to
make certain controversies arbitrable and others nonarbitra-
ble, these limited arbitration clauses create controversies as to
what issues are arbitrable. Thus, whether a broad or narrow
clause is employed by the parties, the court will often be
called upon to decide questions of arbitrability. 13
The USAA provides that an arbitration award will not be
enforced and will be set aside if the arbitrators have decided
nonarbitrable matters.14 The USAA also recognizes, however,
that questions of arbitrability might have to be resolved in
advance of arbitration and apparently contemplates two
mechanisms for the resolution of arbitrability disputes. First,
" See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 564, 584-
85 (1960). In that case the Court held: "In the absence of any provision excluding a
particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a
purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here,
the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad." Id.
12 See, e.g., Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d
831 (7th Cir. 1977); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Bufflier v. Electronic Computer Programming
Inst., Inc., 466 F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1972); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater
Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970); Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d
1100 (2d Cir. 1970); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir.
1968).
It has been generally held that an agreement to arbitrate such claims is not en-
forceable. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). In Wilko the Court held that
an agreement for arbitration of any controversy arising in the future between the
parties was void under § 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, notwithstanding the provi-
sions of the United States Arbitration Act.
13 See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Atkinson v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
" Section 10 of the Act provides that the district court "may make an order
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration -. .. (d)
Where the arbitrators exceed their powers . . . ." 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1976).
See, e.g., Resilient Floor & Decorative Covering Workers, Local Union 1179 v.
Welco Mfg. Co., 542 F.2d 1029 (8th Cir. 1976); Gibbons v. United Transportation
Union, 462 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Nuest v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 313 F.
Supp. 1228 (S.D. Ill. 1970).
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if a claimant believes that a controversy is arbitrable, he can
proceed under section 4 of the Act to compel the other party
to arbitrate.15 Second, if the party seeking arbitration is a
party resisting claims being asserted in a court proceeding,
that party may seek under section 3 of the Act to stay court
proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration.16
The framers of the USAA, however, apparently did not
contemplate arbitration rules, like the current rules adopted
by the American Arbitration Association, which provide that
an arbitration may proceed ex parte if the respondent de-
clines to participate. 1" These provisions for ex parte arbitra-
tion have made motions by claimants to compel arbitration
virtually unnecessary. Instead, the burden has been shifted to
respondents who believe that the controversy is not arbitra-
ble. Facing the possibility of an ex parte arbitration, respon-
dents have sought injunctive relief in the federal courts bar-
ring arbitration;" they assert that irreparable injury will
result if they are forced to choose between allowing the arbi-
tration to go forward ex parte and participating in a lengthy
and expensive arbitration that they believe to involve nonar-
bitrable matters. In view of the alleged irreparable injury, the
district courts generally have held that respondents can secure
injunctive relief against arbitration if they can show that the
matter sought to be arbitrated is nonarbitrable.19
25 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
11 See Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association
§§ 12, 29 (1979) [hereinafter cited as AAA Rules].
18 As a practical matter, however, the distinction between claimants and parties
claimed against does not exist. In many, if not most, cases one party seeks to com-
mence a judicial proceeding while the other party seeks to commence an arbitration.
Under these circumstances, the party seeking arbitration will usually make a motion
to stay the judicial proceedings, while the other moves to enjoin the arbitration. This
appears to have been true in many of the cases cited infra in notes 30-37.
19 See, e.g., Playboy Clubs Int'l, Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bar-
tenders Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 321 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Cf. Lehigh Coal &
Navigation Co. v. Central R.R. of N.J., 33 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (wherein
similar considerations govern the application of the Declaratory Judgment Act to ar-
bitration agreements).
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II. THE APPEALABILITY OF INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS IN
ARBITRATION CASES
The existence of procedures for raising issues of arbi-
trability before the commencement of arbitration proceedings
created the issue of the appealability of district court orders
to stay judicial proceedings, to compel arbitration, and to bar
arbitration.
One branch of the appealability question, the appealabil-
ity of orders staying or refusing to stay judicial proceedings,
was addressed in Justice Reed's opinion for the Court in Bal-
timore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger.20 In Baltimore Contrac-
tors, the district court, acting under section 3 of the USAA,
had denied a stay of an action for an equitable accounting,
pending arbitration. The defendant sought to appeal, relying
in part on what is now section 1292(a)(1) of the Judicial Code,
which generally permits appeals from "interlocutory orders of
the district courts of the United States. . . granting, continu-
ing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing
to dissolve or modify injunctions .. ."21 The court of appeals
dismissed the appeal in a per curiam decision and, on certio-
rari, the Supreme Court held that the denial of the stay was
not appealable.
The Court found that the order's appealability under sec-
tion 1292(a)(1) depended on whether the district court's re-
fusal to grant the stay was the refusal of an "injunction"
under the statute.2  The Court viewed section 1292(a)(1) as a
Congressional modification of the finality rule that "seem[ed]
plainly to spring from a developing need to permit litigants to
effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps
irreparable, consequence. '2 3 In refusing to extend the scope of
the provision, however, the Court followed what is known as
the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine2 4 and held that since the under-
20 348 U.S. at 176.
' Defendant also asserted that the judgment was final and thus appealable
under § 1291 of the Judicial Code. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Id. at
179.
22 Id. at 180.
23 Id. at 181 (footnote omitted).
2, See Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942); Enelow v. New
1980-81]
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lying court action was equitable rather than legal in nature,
the lower court's ruling was a mere step in controlling the liti-
gation, rather than a refusal of an interlocutory injunction.
The Court recognized that the "incongruity of taking ju-
risdiction from a stay in a law type and denying jurisdiction in
an equity type proceeding springs from the persistence of out-
moded procedural differentiations, 25 but concluded that "it is
better judicial practice to follow the precedents which limit
appealability of interlocutory orders, leaving Congress to
make such amendments as it may find proper." 26 As the Court
recognized in Baltimore Contractors, the law/equity distinc-
tion created by Enelow-Ettelson is difficult to support in
terms of policy; it can only be understood as an historical
anomaly.
In motions to compel arbitration, however, the courts uni-
formly have recognized that the grant or denial of the motion
represents a final judgment in a special statutory proceeding
and therefore is appealable under section 1291.27 Thus, where
York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935). The Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, succinctly
stated, provides that:
An order staying or refusing to stay proceedings in the District Court is
appealable under § 1292(a)(1) only if (A) the action in which the order was
made is an action which, before the fusion of law and equity, was by its
nature an action at law; and (B) the stay was sought to permit the prior
determination of some equitable defense or counterclaim.
Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844, 845 (5th Cir. 1962) (footnote omitted).
The theory behind the doctrine is that the stay of a legal action in order to try
first an equitable claim is, in effect, an injunction issued by a chancellor, while the
stay of an equitable proceeding by the chancellor is simply a ruling as to the manner
in which he will try one issue in a civil action pending before him. See City of Mor-
gantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 257-58 (1949). For purposes of the Enelow-
Ettelson doctrine, a claim that the dispute is arbitrable is considered an equitable
defense. See Shanferoke Coal & Supply Co. v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U.S.
449 (1935).
25 348 U.S. at 184.
26 Id. at 185.
27 See, e.g., N.V. Maatschapij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 532
F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1976); New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d
at 183; Rogers v. Schering Corp., 262 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nom.
Hexagon Laboratories, Inc. v. Rogers, 359 U.S. 991 (1959); John Thompson Beacon
Windows, Ltd. v. Ferro, Inc., 232 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1956). At least in the Second
Circuit, however, this uniformity holds true only if the petition to compel arbitration
is brought in an independent proceeding. See, e.g., N.V. Maastschapij Voor Indus-
triele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 532 F.2d at 874; Clark v. Krafter Corp., 447 F.2d
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an order is issued compelling or refusing to compel proceed-
ings in the arbitration forum or where an order is issued "en-
joining" or refusing to "enjoin" a separate action at law pend-
ing arbitration, an immediate appeal is available. 8
With respect to efforts to enjoin arbitration, the clear lan-
guage of section 1292(a)(1) appears to make the grant or de-
nial of all interlocutory injunctions appealable, and the ap-
pealability of orders granting or denying injunctions against
arbitration should be uncontroverted.29 This, however, has not
proved to be the case.
Eight federal circuits have considered the appealability
933 (2d Cir. 1971).
The Act itself specifically bars interlocutory orders compelling arbitration. Sec-
tion 4 of the Act carefully spells out that "[i]f the making of the arbitration agree-
ment or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue" the court
must proceed to the trial of these issues before it may order the parties to submit to
arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
28 These decisions appear to be consistent with the general rule that grants or
denials of injunctions against proceedings in other forums fall within § 1292(a)(1) and
are appealable. See, e.g., Codex Corp. v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 553 F.2d 735 (1st Cir.
1977) (federal district court); In re W.F. Hurley, Inc., 553 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1976)
(federal district court); In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litigation, 521 F.2d 755
(3d Cir. 1975) (state court); Sayers v. Forsyth Bldg. Corp., 417 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1969)
(state and federal district courts).
29 In practice, if the question of arbitrability is to be resolved before arbitration
occurs, it must be resolved expeditiously. Accordingly, the issue of arbitrability at
this stage generally comes before the district court in the form of a motion for prelim-
inary injunction, the appealability of which is governed by § 1292(a)(1) of the Judicial
Code.
It is at least theoretically possible that the district court might enter a final order
granting or denying injunctive relief. Such an order would be appealable under § 1291
of the Judicial Code if it were the only relief sought in the litigation or if the district
court were to enter a final judgment as to that particular claim under Rule 54(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In addition, it may be possible to set aside an erroneous district court order,
granting or denying an injunction, by mandamus, but decisions make clear that this
remedy will only be available in a rare case. See, e.g., Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth
Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied sub nor. Dawson v. Lum-
mus Co., 368 U.S. 986 (1962).
The grant of an injunction against arbitration may also sometimes be appealed
by moving for a stay of judicial proceedings and appealing from the denial of that
stay, rather than appealing from the grant of the preliminary injunction. This is pos-
sible only where the Enelow-Ettelson standard is satisfied. At least one court has
recognized this means of avoiding the rule of nonappealability. See New England
Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d 183 (1st Cir. 1972). For a discussion
of the Enelow-Ettelson standard, see note 24 supra.
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under section 1292(a)(1) of orders granting or denying injunc-
tions barring arbitration. The Fifth,30 Sixth,31 Seventh,32
Ninth,33 and Tenth34 Circuits have held such orders appeal-
able. The Second3 5 and Third36 Circuits have held these or-
ders nonappealable. The First Circuit 7 and, apparently, the
District of Columbia Circuit,38 have held that the grant of an
injunction barring arbitration is appealable, while the denial
of such an injunction is not. The commentators also are di-
vided as to the appealability of these injunctive orders.39
The basic rationale for appealability of these orders was
first enunciated by the Ninth Circuit in A. & E. Plastik Pak
Co. v. Monsanto Co.40 In that case, the district court had de-
nied appellant's motion to enjoin appellee from proceeding
with arbitration. The court of appeals distinguished this type
of decision from one involving a court's staying or refusing to
30 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. International Union of United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 476 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1973). See
also Wickes Corp. v. Industrial Financial Corp., 493 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1974).
31 Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 466 F.2d at 694.
31 Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d at 831;
Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d at 611.
33 Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d at 980; A. & E. Plas-
tik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d at 710.
34 Medical Development Corp. v. Industrial Modeling Corp., 479 F.2d 345 (10th
Cir. 1973).
35 Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 516 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1975);
Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc. v. Ninfo, 490 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1974); Greater Continental
Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d at 1100; Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297
F.2d at 80.
28 Stateside Mach. Co., Ltd. v. Alperin, 526 F.2d 480 (3d Cir. 1975).
37 New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d at 183.
38 Compare Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Condec Corp., No. 76-
1300 (April 5, 1977) with Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Condec Corp.,
No. 77-1431 (July 5, 1977). These District of Columbia Circuit decisions are unre-
ported and, under the rules of that circuit, may not be cited as precedent in the
District of Columbia Circuit. General Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit Rule 8(f).
39 Compare 9 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.20 [4.-1], at 249 (2d
ed. 1980) (nothing can be more destructive of the congressional policy of fostering
arbitration than to permit preliminary skirmishing over arbitration agreements in the
form of a lawsuit and an appeal) with 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E.
GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3923, at 58-60 (1977) (most courts
have adopted the obvious conclusion that an order prohibiting arbitration is an in-
junction, whose grant or denial is subject to interlocutary appeal).
40 396 F.2d at 710.
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stay its own hand in deference to proceedings going forward in
another forum. The court of appeals found that:
Here the court was asked (and declined) affirmatively to in-
terfere with proceedings in another forum; to exercise its eq-
uity powers to halt action of its litigants outside of its own
court proceedings - the classic form of injunction. That ar-
bitration is not a mere extension of court proceedings but
involves a separate tribunal seems clear .... 41
Because the lower court's order was one refusing an "injunc-
tion," it was appealable under section 1292(a)(1). 41
The approach taken by the First, Second and Third Cir-
cuits in reaching an opposite determination has been quite
different. These courts have rejected a literal reading of the
language of section 1292(a)(1) and have looked to see whether
interlocutory orders granting or denying injunctions against
arbitration ought, on policy grounds, to be treated as appeal-
able; in so doing, they have concluded that such appeals
should not be allowed. Whether this conclusion is sound, how-
ever, is open to question.
III. THE POLICIES BEHIND THE SPLIT IN THE COURTS OF
APPEALS
Two grounds have been advanced for nonappealability.
First, the courts have stated that the potential prejudice flow-
ing from an incorrect ruling by the trial court - useless judi-
cial or arbitration proceedings - is not the sort of serious
consequence that section 1292(a)(1) was intended to avoid.43
Accordingly, the courts have noted that since arbitration does
not produce an enforceable result without further judicial ac-
tion, an erroneous ruling is not likely to have any other harm-
41 Id. at 713. See note 28 supra for cases applying the general rule that grants or
denials of injunctions against proceedings in other forums are appealable under §
1291(a)(1).
42 Id. Also, it has been said that the practical result of such an order is to termi-
nate recourse to arbitration and, as such, the order qualifies as an injunction within
the meaning of § 1292(a)(1). See, e.g., Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d at 611.
43 Stateside Mach. Co., Ltd. v. Alpeun, 526 F.2d at 483-84; Greater Continental
Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d at 1103; Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297
F.2d at 85-86.
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ful consequences. Relying on Baltimore Contractors, these
courts have found that orders enjoining or declining to enjoin
arbitration are not "orders of serious, perhaps irreparable,
consequence" within the language of the Baltimore Contrac-
tors opinion and, thus, are not the type of ruling that Con-
gress intended to include within the purview of section
1292(a)(1).
Second, the courts have stated that allowing an appeal
from a denial of a stay of arbitration would further delay
those proceedings and thereby would eliminate one of the pri-
mary purposes of arbitration - speed and economy in
proceeding.44
These rationales are difficult to defend. The first justifica-
tion relied on by the courts for denying an appeal - the sup-
posed lack of irreparable injury - is unpersuasive. The exis-
tence of irreparable injury is not a criterion for appeal under
section 1292(a)(1). Nothing in the language or legislative his-
tory of section 1292(a)(1) suggests any intention to limit the
types of injunctive orders that would be appealable. Addition-
ally, reliance on the Baltimore Contractors opinion is mis-
placed. The language of the opinion, in referring to "orders of
serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence," clearly appeared
to be a description of the congressional purpose in enacting
section 1292(a)(1), rather than a definition of the category of
cases in which such appeals would be allowed.'0
When Congress originally enacted the predecessor to sec-
tion 1292(a)(1), allowing appeals of interlocutory injunctive
orders, the section was enacted as part of a broader statute
creating the modern federal system of trial and intermediate
appellate courts.46 Congress did not focus much attention on
the provision dealing with the appealability of these orders.47
The primary purposes of the statute were to ease the do6ket
of an overburdened Supreme Court and to put an end to "ju-
dicial despotism" and the lack of "evenhanded justice" arising
44 422 F.2d at 1102; 297 F.2d at 85-86.
45 348 U.S. at 181.
46 Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 828 (1891).
47 See 21 CONG. REC. 10222 (1890).
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from the absence of review of trial court judgments." Nothing
in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
create an irreparable injury test in appeals of orders granting
or denying injunctions.
Moreover, irreparable injury is, in fact, present where an
injunction against arbitration is granted or denied. The conse-
quences of the grant of denial of injunctive orders are far from
trivial, as the remedies of arbitration proceedings and court
trials may differ dramatically. As the Supreme Court has
noted:
The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an impor-
tant part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action.
The change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may
make a radical difference in ultimate result. Arbitration car-
ries no right to trial by jury that is guaranteed. . . by the
Seventh Amendment .... Arbitrators do not have the ben-
efit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give
their reasons for their results; the record of their proceed-
48 21 CONG. REc. 3404 (1890). It was noted:
The right to review the judgments of a trial court upon the record
before another tribunal is as dear to freemen as liberty itself, and in a free
country should not be denied or seriously abridged.
If this measure becomes law, this invaluable right will be secured in all
cases, civil and criminal, except the lowest grades of misdemeanors. The
fact that such a system of jurisprudence has been so long maintained and
upheld is not just a criticism upon the Constitution. The provisions of the
Constitution in respect of the judicial power of the United States and the
establishment of courts were framed with the consummate skill and a won-
derful appreciation of the possibilities of the Government and country.
Id.
Id Id. Moreover, Congress has amended the statute several times to expand the
scope of appealable injunctive orders. The 1891 legislation provided for appeals only
from the grant or continuation of an interlocutory injunction. In 1895, orders refusing
to grant or dissolving or refusing to dissolve injunctions were also made appealable.
Ch. 96, 28 Stat. 666 (1895).
In 1900, Congress amended the statute to provide additionally for interlocutory
appeals from orders appointing receivers. Ch. 803, 31 Stat. 660 (1900). In so doing,
Congress deleted the language added by 28 Stat. 666 (1895). This deletion was clearly
inadvertent and the language of the 1895 Act was restored by Ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1134
(1911). See 33 CONG. Rc. 5501, 6757, 6802-03 (1900); S. REP. No. 388, 61st Cong., 2d
Sess. 53 (1910). In 1925, the statute was once again broadened to include orders mod-
ifying or refusing to modify injuctions. Ch. 229, 43 Stat. 937 (1925). See also Stewart-
Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1963)
(Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 944 (1964).
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ings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and the judi-
cial review of an award is more limited than judicial review
of a trial .... 50
Additionally, arbitration usually has no established proce-
dures for discovery. 1 Consequently, the question of the ap-
propriate forum in which to resolve disputes is clearly more
than academic.
The second justification for nonappealability, to further
the speed and economy interests inherent in the arbitration
proceeding,5 2 is not persuasive in view of the delay and ex-
pense that results from useless proceedings. While the parties
in arbitration generally do not have the large discovery costs
that are incurred in judicial proceedings, in complex proceed-
ings the parties generally must pay arbitrators' fees under the
rules of the American Arbitration Association and other arbi-
tration tribunals.53 In a lengthy arbitration, the fees may
amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars. 4 Moreover, a
party who is compelled to go forward with arbitration may not
have the resources at the conclusion of the arbitration to pur-
sue the issue of arbitrability in order to vindicate his right to
judicial resolution and to prosecute his claims in court if he is
successful. Similarly, a party who is improperly deprived of an
arbitration remedy and who is compelled to litigate his claims
in court also will incur substantial costs.
The district courts in granting or denying injunctions
11 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. at 203.
51 See AAA Rules §§ 28, 30.32 for rules governing the order of proceedings, the
presentation of evidence and the right of the Arbitrator to make an investigation.
'2 See, e.g., Stateside Mach. Co., Ltd. v. Alperin, 526 F.2d at 484 n.13. The Third
Circuit observed:
Since the relative speed and economy of arbitration are generally re-
garded as major incentives to the election of that form of conflict resolution
as an alternative to judicial proceedings, we do not believe that the sums
occasionally wasted on arbitration are likely to prove of sufficient magni-
tude to cause irreparable harm.
Id.
" See AAA Rules § 50 for a discussion of the Arbitrator's fee rule.
" In addition, under the AAA Rules the claimant must make a payment to the
association that is graduated according to the size of the claim. See AAA Rules § 47
for a discussion of the administrative fee schedule. Where a large claim is involved,
the required payment may be very substantial.
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against arbitration have recognized the potential irreparable
injury from compelling a party to litigate in the wrong fo-
rum." If there is sufficient irreparable injury for a district
court injunction, there should be sufficient irreparable injury
to allow an appeal. Indeed, some state statutes have recog-
nized the importance of resolving the question of arbitrability
before arbitration or court proceedings by providing that the
parties served with a demand for arbitration must move for a
stay of arbitration and must raise any issue of arbitrability at
that time.5"
Although the policies of other federal statutes may have a
bearing on the question of appealability, 57 the USAA offers no
clearly articulated policy against appealability of decisions
granting or denying injunctions against arbitration. As noted
earlier, Congress probably did not even consider the existence
of the ex parte arbitration rules that led to the necessity for
injunctive relief; instead, Congress apparently contemplated
that a party resisting arbitation would not be required to arbi-
trate until the party seeking arbitration had successfully se-
cured an order compelling arbitration - an order that would
be appealable.
Significantly, the courts of appeals that have held that in-
junctive orders respecting arbitration are not appealable have
focused their attention on the appealability of those orders
that have refused to enjoin arbitration.58 But where an injunc-
tion against arbitration is erroneously granted, the very rem-
edy which the USAA is designed to preserve will be denied
improperly, and the parties may have to go through a district
court trial and appeal before the arbitration remedy becomes
available.
Even where an order denying an injunction is involved,
the policies of the USAA favoring prompt and inexpensive
55 See Playboy Clubs Int'l, Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders
Union, AFL-CIO, 321 F. Supp. at 707.
" See, e.g., N.Y. [CPLR] LAW § 7503 (McKinney 1980).
57 See generally Dyk, Supreme Court Review of Interlocutory State-Court Deci-
sions: "The Twilight Zone of Finality," 19 STAN. L. REv. 907, 940-42 (1967).
58 See, e.g., Stateside Mach. Co., Ltd. v. Alperin, 526 F.2d at 480; Greater Conti-
nental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d at 1100; Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref.
Co., 297 F.2d at 80.
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resolution of controversies are frustrated by a decision declin-
ing to review orders denying injunctions, since the parties may
be compelled to complete a lengthy and costly arbitration pro-
ceeding only to discover that the merits are not in fact arbi-
trable.59 Further, where the potentially arbitrable claim arises
under the federal antitrust or securities laws, the case for ap-
pealability is even stronger. These statutes reflect a policy
against compelling arbitration which would be frustrated if an
injunction were improperly denied, and the parties were com-
pelled to go forward in arbitration.
Finally, whether an injunction is granted or denied, the
rule of nonappealability may make arbitration clauses far less
attractive to contracting parties, since they will be unable to
determine finally, in advance of lengthy court or arbitration
proceedings, whether the matters are arbitrable or are re-
served for judicial resolution. This potential discouragement
of arbitration is inconsistent with federal policies designed to
encourage utilization of the remedy.60
CONCLUSION
In summary, whatever policy arguments may exist for au-
thorizing or refusing to authorize appeals from injunctive or-
ders, the failure of section 1292(a)(1) to create an exception
for injunctive orders barring arbitration should foreclose a
holding of nonappealability. In determining the policy of ap-
pealability, the courts that have refused appeals have asserted
an inappropriate policy-making role.61 The dangers of such ju-
" As noted earlier, despite the general purpose of arbitration to secure a speedy
and economical result, many commercial arbitrations involve complex issues that re-
quire lengthy and expensive proceedings to resolve.
11 While federal policy favors arbitrating arbitrable disputes, there is no such
policy with respect to submitting disputes to arbitration that have not been made
arbitrable by contract. Nonetheless, in at least one circuit, and possibly two, orders
granting an injunction are appealable while those denying an injunction are not. See
notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction in the
appealability of these orders. This particular distinction seems almost impossible to
defend under § 1292(a)(1) and may cause arbitration of issues made nonarbitrable by
contract.
61 Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981). In Risiord the
United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded an Eighth Circuit decision that
held district court orders denying disqualification of counsel motions to be non-
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dicial intrusion are evidenced by the fact that the courts de-
clining to entertain appeals have misread the policies of the
USAA, have ignored the serious consequences of denying the
right to appeal, and have created an unjustified distinction
between injunctive orders compelling arbitration and injunc-
tive orders barring (or refusing to bar) arbitration.
Perhaps the most serious consequence of court decisions
holding nonappealable district court orders granting or deny-
ing injunctions against arbitration, however, is that the ques-
tion of whether these orders were properly or improperly is-
sued, as a practical matter, will never be reviewed by a court
of appeals since these injunctive claims rarely go to final judg-
ment. Consequently, in circuits where the orders are held non-
appealable, no uniform rule exists to govern whether district
courts may or may not enjoin the arbitration, and contracting
parties similarly are left with little guidance.
appealable but which applied its holding prospectively only.
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